Port Imperial Manhattan

Response to Factuals:
US Coast Guard
NY Waterway

Total pages five (5) including this cover

Ford Robert

From: Pete Johansen [johansen@nywaterway.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 4:02 PM
To: fordr@ntsb.gov
Subject: Port Imperial Manhattan Fire Commnets

To: Mr. Robert B. Ford, NTSB

From: Peter Johansen, NY Waterway

I have reviewed the draft report on the Port Imperial Manhattan fire Accident No. CDA01MM008 and offer the following comments:

1- On page 5 Under Crew, Master second paragraph second sentence, it should read "He ws hired by NY Waterway as deckhand in January 1999" vice January 2000.

2- On page 7, Under Engine Room, second paragraph, first sentence. The door to the engine room is alluminum and is insulated. It is not a wooden door.

If we can be of any help to you, please feel free to contact us.

U.S. Department of Transportation
United States Coast Guard

Investigation and Analysis Branch
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06/14/01

Mr. Robert Ford
NTSB
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594-2000

Dear Mr. Ford:

As previously requested, I am returning the original draft copy of the Port Imperial Manhattan report. I have made two notations directly on the report. The first addresses Captain Siozon's employment history while the second deals with the location of portable extinguishers. I have completed my report and have forwarded it to my supervisors. I anticipate that it will be ready for release within the next two months. As I am leaving the Coast Guard, I ask that you contact LT Kelly Post at 718-354-4222 for any inquiries/concerns.

Sincerely,

LT Daniel Fitzgerald

called 9/24/01

passengers each day.[2] However, the Coast Guard stated that the vessels were not considered "ferries" in accordance with the regulations. Ferry routes are strictly defined while NY Waterway vessels are less specific. They are used for dinner cruises as well as sightseeing and excursion tours.

Operations--The *Manhattan* operated on a regular scheduled service between the 38th Street terminal in Manhattan to Lincoln Harbor, Weehawkin, New Jersey. The service operated from 0700 until 2300 with a transit time of approximately seven minutes.

Crew

Master -- At the time of the accident, the master, 30, had been working for the company since January 1999. He held a U.S. Coast Guard license as Master, near coastal steam or motor vessels of not more than 100 gross tons. He had first received his license in June 1999. He had not received any formal fire fighting training.

The master had been in the marine industry from 1994. He was hired by NY Waterways as deckhand in January 2000. He worked as a deckhand from January until April 1999. In May he was promoted to master and served on various vessels and routes. From June 30, 2000 until the night of the accident he served as master on the *Manhattan*.

The master stated that he had gone to bed between 11 and 12 p.m. on each of the preceding nights. He stated that he had arisen at 9 a.m. on the day of the accident and was well rested.

Senior Deckhand (#1) - The senior deckhand, 20, had been with the company for one year and seven months. He started working for the company after graduating from high school. He did not hold, nor was he required to hold, any Coast Guard certificates or endorsements. He had not received any formal fire fighting training. He had worked on other boats on different shifts and had worked on the *Manhattan* on previous occasions. He began the new shift on the *Manhattan* the same week as the accident.

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[2] For contrast, the officers stated, the Staten Island Ferry Service carries 60,000 passengers each day. However, Staten Island Ferries are inspected and regulated under a different set of regulations. New York Waterways vessels are all inspected and regulated under 46 CFR Subchapter T while Staten Island Ferry vessels are inspected and regulated under 46 CFR Subchapter H.

Lifesaving and Emergency Equipment -- The vessel's fire fighting system consisted of two fire pumps, two 1-1/2" fire stations midships in the main cabin, six fire extinguishers, and one hose on the upper deck. The fire pumps were operated from the engine room.

The type and locations of extinguishers were:
Location (??) ✓ 1 2-1/2 lb. and 1 10 lb. dry chemical in the pilot house;
✓ 2 15 lb. CO_2 extinguishers on the main deck (port and Starboard);
? (1) 15 lb. CO_2 in the engine space:
(1) 15 lb. CO_2 on the stern.
I thought 2 In the engine ROOM!! — I have a Inspection report from Sea Safety that indicates that there were (2) (15lb) CO_2 extinguishers in the engine room

The vessel's lifesaving equipment consisted of 354 lifejackets, seven rigid buoyant apparatus[4], 2 ring buoys with lights, 1 ring buoy with light and 60 foot line, 1 man overboard ladder, 1 fire axe, and 2 fire pumps. The engine room did not have a fixed fire suppression or detection system and was not required by Coast Guard regulations.[5]

Waterway Information

The *Port Imperial Manhattan* operated on a route between the 38th street terminal on the west side of Manhattan and Lincoln Harbor, Weehawkin, New Jersey on the Hudson River. The currents in the Hudson River are influenced by freshets, winds and droughts. The currents usually set fair with the channels except in the vicinity of bends and wharves. The velocities of currents average approximately 1.3 to 1.6 knots.

Meteorological Information

[4] The rigid buoyant apparatus are flotation devices with a line attached around its periphery. Survivors in the water hold onto this line. The apparatus lacks a platform to support survivors in the water. The *Manhattan* was not required to carry rigid buoyant apparatus in accordance with 46 CFR Subchapter T part 180.207(d).
[5] 46CFR Subchapter T-Part 177.115, Vessels in existence on March 10, 1996 comply with regulations on this date.